User:
How do you establish that a corporation has a special relationship with a tort victim under California law? 

Opine:
To establish that a corporation has a special relationship with a tort victim under California law, courts apply a two-step framework established by the California Supreme Court (Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal.5th 204, 209-210 (2021)). 

Step 1: Determine if a special relationship exists 

A special relationship between a defendant corporation and a victim arises when the victim has a right to expect protection from the defendant, or when the defendant has an ability to control the conduct of a third party who causes harm (Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal.5th 204, 216 (2021); Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 90 F.4th 946, 949-950 (2024)). This relationship typically involves some degree of dependency or control (Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal.5th 204, 216 (2021)). 

Courts consider several factors to determine if a special relationship exists: 

1. Vulnerability of the victim: If the victim is particularly vulnerable or dependent on the corporation for protection, this supports finding a special relationship (Safechuck v. MJJ Productions, Inc., 94 Cal. App. 5th 675, 691-692 (2023)). 

2. Control over the environment: If the corporation has control over the environment where the harm occurred, this supports finding a special relationship (Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 806 (1984)). 

3. Benefit to the corporation: If the corporation derives a benefit from its relationship with the victim, this can support finding a special relationship (Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 806 (1984)). 

4. Ability to prevent harm: If the corporation is in a position to take steps to prevent the harm, this supports finding a special relationship (Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal.5th 204, 216 (2021)). 

5. Foreseeability of harm: If the harm was reasonably foreseeable to the corporation, this supports finding a special relationship (T.L. v. City Ambulance of Eureka, Inc., 83 Cal. App. 5th 864, 887-888 (2022)). 

Examples of special relationships that have been recognized include: 

- Business proprietors and their patrons or invitees (Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 806 (1984)). 

- Employers and employees, at least while the employee is at work (Colonial Van & Storage, Inc. v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 5th 487, 500-501 (2022)). 

- Common carriers and passengers (T.L. v. City Ambulance of Eureka, Inc., 83 Cal. App. 5th 864, 883 (2022)). 

Step 2: Apply the Rowland factors 

If a special relationship is found to exist, courts then consider the Rowland factors to determine whether policy considerations justify creating an exception to the duty of care (Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal.5th 204, 217-218 (2021)). These factors include: 

1. Foreseeability of harm 
2. Degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury 
3. Closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered 
4. Moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct 
5. Policy of preventing future harm 
6. Extent of the burden to the defendant 
7. Consequences to the community of imposing a duty 
8. Availability and cost of insurance 

(Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal.5th 204, 217-218 (2021); T.L. v. City Ambulance of Eureka, Inc., 83 Cal. App. 5th 864, 875-876 (2022)) 

It's important to note that the analysis of these factors is done at a broad level, considering the category of conduct rather than the specific facts of the case (T.L. v. City Ambulance of Eureka, Inc., 83 Cal. App. 5th 864, 875-876 (2022)). 

Recent developments and considerations: 

1. The California Supreme Court has emphasized that the special relationship doctrine is separate from the general duty of care under Civil Code section 1714(a) (Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal.5th 204, 209-210 (2021)). 

2. There is some uncertainty in California law regarding the exact test for determining when a corporation has created or contributed to a risk of harm. Some courts have applied a "necessary component" test, requiring that the harm be a necessary component of the corporation's business model (Jane Doe No. 1 v. Uber Techs., Inc., 79 Cal. App. 5th 410 (2022), as discussed in Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 90 F.4th 946, 950 (2024)). However, this test has been called into question by more recent California Supreme Court decisions that focus on whether the defendant's "entire conduct created a risk of harm" to the plaintiff (Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc., 14 Cal. 5th 993 (2023), as discussed in Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 90 F.4th 946, 951 (2024)). 

3. The extent of a corporation's duty may be limited by public policy considerations, even if a special relationship is found to exist (Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal.5th 204, 221-222 (2021)). 

In conclusion, establishing a special relationship between a corporation and a tort victim under California law requires a careful analysis of the nature of the relationship, the corporation's control and ability to prevent harm, and broader policy considerations. The law in this area continues to evolve, and courts are grappling with how to apply these principles in the context of modern business models and technologies. 

Rules Summary: 
• Two-step framework for determining special relationships: 
1. Determine if a special relationship exists 
2. Apply the Rowland factors 

• Factors for determining if a special relationship exists: 
- Vulnerability of the victim 
- Control over the environment 
- Benefit to the corporation 
- Ability to prevent harm 
- Foreseeability of harm 

• A special relationship arises when: 
- The victim has a right to expect protection from the defendant, or 
- The defendant has an ability to control the conduct of a third party who causes harm 

• Rowland factors for determining whether policy considerations justify an exception to the duty of care: 
1. Foreseeability of harm 
2. Degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury 
3. Closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered 
4. Moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct 
5. Policy of preventing future harm 
6. Extent of the burden to the defendant 
7. Consequences to the community of imposing a duty 
8. Availability and cost of insurance

• The Rowland factors are evaluated at a broad level, considering the category of conduct rather than specific facts 

• There is uncertainty in California law regarding the exact test for determining when a corporation has created or contributed to a risk of harm: 

  - Some courts apply a "necessary component" test 

  - More recent decisions focus on whether the defendant's "entire conduct created a risk of harm" 

• The extent of a corporation's duty may be limited by public policy considerations, even if a special relationship is found to exist 

User:
What is the process for establishing that a mining operator has a vested right to operate without needing to comply with SMARA?

Opine:
The process for establishing that a mining operator has a vested right to operate without needing to comply with SMARA involves both statutory requirements and judicial interpretation. 

Statutory Framework: 

Under the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1975 (SMARA), a person who has obtained a vested right to conduct surface mining operations prior to January 1, 1976, is not required to secure a permit to continue those operations, as long as no substantial changes are made and the operations continue. (Pub. Resources Code, § 2776.) The statute specifies that a person shall be deemed to have vested rights if, prior to January 1, 1976, they have, in good faith and in reliance upon a permit or other authorization (if required), diligently commenced surface mining operations and incurred substantial liabilities for work and materials necessary for the operations. (Pub. Resources Code, § 2776.) 

Regulatory Framework: 

The regulations implementing SMARA provide more detailed procedures for establishing vested rights. A claim of vested rights must be adjudicated in a public hearing before the lead agency or the State Mining and Geology Board. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 3815.) The hearing procedures require proper notice, an opportunity for interested parties to be heard, and a formal determination based on the evidence presented. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 3815, 3816, 3817.) 

Judicial Interpretation: 

The courts have further clarified and expanded on the process for establishing vested rights under SMARA. In Calvert v. County of Yuba, the court held that the determination of vested rights for surface mining operations subject to the "diminishing asset" doctrine requires a public adjudicatory hearing that meets procedural due process requirements. (145 Cal. App. 4th 613, 622-623 (2006).) This means that affected landowners must be given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before a vested rights determination is made. (Id. at 626-627.) 

The court in Calvert emphasized that the vested rights determination involves several factual issues that require adjudicative exercise of judgment rather than ministerial application of fixed standards. (Id. at 624-625.) These include determining "substantial changes" in operations, "substantial liabilities" incurred, and whether the area was "clearly intended" to be mined under the diminishing asset doctrine. (Id.) 

The "diminishing asset" doctrine, recognized in California in Hansen Bros. Enters. v. Bd. of Supervisors, allows mining operations to expand into unmined areas of the property if there was an objective manifestation of intent to mine those areas when zoning changed. (12 Cal. 4th 533, 553-554 (1996).) To establish a vested right under this doctrine, the mining operator must show that: (1) part of the same area was being surface mined when the land use law became effective, and (2) the area the operator desires to surface mine was clearly intended to be mined when the land use law became effective, as measured by objective manifestations and not by subjective intent. (Id. at 555-556.) 

The burden of proof is on the party asserting a right to a nonconforming use to establish the lawful and continuing existence of the use at the time of the enactment of the ordinance. (Hansen Bros., 12 Cal. 4th at 564.) This means that the mining operator must provide evidence of the extent and nature of their operations as of January 1, 1976, as well as their intent to mine additional areas if claiming rights under the diminishing asset doctrine. 

It's important to note that the vested right extends only to the property on which the use existed at the time zoning regulations changed and the use became nonconforming. (Hansen Bros., 12 Cal. 4th at 560.) The right to expand mining operations on the property is limited by the extent that the particular material was being excavated when the zoning law became effective. (Id. at 557.) 

In terms of the specific process, a mining operator claiming vested rights would typically need to: 

1. Submit a claim of vested rights to the lead agency or the State Mining and Geology Board. 

2. Provide evidence of mining operations as of January 1, 1976, including permits, authorizations, extent of operations, and substantial liabilities incurred. 

3. If claiming rights under the diminishing asset doctrine, provide evidence of objective intent to mine additional areas as of January 1, 1976. 

4. Participate in a public adjudicatory hearing where the claim will be evaluated. 

5. If the vested rights claim is approved, submit a reclamation plan for any areas subject to surface mining operations after January 1, 1976. (Pub. Resources Code, § 2770(b).) 

It's worth noting that the determination of vested rights is made as of January 1, 1976, and subsequent changes in ownership do not affect these rights. The Surface Mining and Reclamation Act specifically states that when one operator succeeds to the interest of another in any incompleted surface mining operation by sale, assignment, transfer, conveyance, exchange, or other means, the successor shall be bound by the provisions of the approved reclamation plan and the provisions of SMARA. (Pub. Resources Code, § 2779.) 

Rules Summary: 

 • Vested Rights Criteria: 

  - A person has vested rights if, prior to January 1, 1976, they: 

    • In good faith and reliance on a permit or authorization (if required) 

    • Diligently commenced surface mining operations 

    • Incurred substantial liabilities for work and materials necessary for the operations 

 • Diminishing Asset Doctrine: 

  - Allows expansion into unmined areas if: 

    • Part of the same area was being mined when land use law became effective 

    • The area to be mined was clearly intended for mining when the law became effective 

    • Intent is measured by objective manifestations, not subjective intent 

 • Procedural Requirements: 

  - Vested rights claims require a public adjudicatory hearing 

  - Hearing must provide reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard for affected parties 

  - Burden of proof is on the party asserting vested rights 

 • Scope of Vested Rights: 

  - Limited to property and operations existing as of January 1, 1976 

  - Right to expand limited by extent of material being excavated when law became effective 

  - Does not extend to adjacent property acquired after zoning change 

 • Reclamation Plan Requirement: 

  - Even with vested rights, a reclamation plan is required for areas mined after January 1, 1976 

 • Succession of Ownership: 

  - Vested rights and obligations under SMARA transfer to new owners of mining operations

User:
Explain how the standard review for abortion regulations under the US constitution has changed over time.

Opine:
The standard of review for abortion regulations under the US Constitution has undergone significant changes over time, evolving from a strict scrutiny approach to an undue burden test, and finally to rational basis review. 

In 1973, Roe v. Wade established the initial framework for reviewing abortion regulations. The Court held that the right to privacy encompassed a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy, but that this right was not absolute and must be considered against important state interests in regulation (410 U.S. 113, 153-154). Roe introduced a trimester framework, where during the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the woman and her doctor. After the first trimester, the State could regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health. After viability, the State could regulate or even proscribe abortion to promote its interest in potential life, except where necessary for the life or health of the mother (410 U.S. 113, 164-165). 

In 1992, Planned Parenthood v. Casey partly overruled Roe and modified the standard of review. Casey reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe that women have a right to obtain an abortion before viability without undue interference from the State, but rejected Roe's rigid trimester framework (505 U.S. 833, 844-846). Instead, Casey introduced the undue burden test: a provision of law is invalid if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability (505 U.S. 833, 874-879). This new standard allowed states more leeway to regulate abortion, as long as they did not impose an undue burden. 

The undue burden test was further clarified in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt in 2016. The Court emphasized that the undue burden test requires courts to consider both the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer (579 U.S. 582, 607-608). This clarification suggested a more stringent application of the undue burden test, requiring a careful balancing of benefits and burdens. 

However, in 2022, Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org. fundamentally changed the landscape of abortion jurisprudence by overruling both Roe and Casey. The Court held that the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion, rejecting the notion that abortion is a fundamental right (597 U.S. 215, 238-240). As a result, the Court concluded that the appropriate standard for reviewing abortion regulations is rational basis review: laws regulating abortion are valid if there is a rational basis on which the legislature could have thought that it would serve legitimate state interests (597 U.S. 215, 300-301). 

The Dobbs Court reasoned that neither the specific practice of abortion nor any broader right to privacy or autonomy is deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition, which is required for an unenumerated right to be protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause (597 U.S. 215, 238-240). The Court also rejected arguments that the abortion right could be justified as a component of a broader entrenched right to autonomy, distinguishing abortion from other rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment due to its impact on what Roe termed "potential life" (597 U.S. 215, 257). 

In adopting rational basis review, the Dobbs Court identified several legitimate state interests that can justify abortion regulations, including respect for and preservation of prenatal life at all stages of development, protection of maternal health and safety, mitigation of fetal pain, and prevention of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or disability (597 U.S. 215, 301). Under this new standard, a law regulating abortion is entitled to a strong presumption of validity and must be sustained if there is a rational basis on which the legislature could have thought it would serve legitimate state interests (597 U.S. 215, 300-301). 

This shift from the undue burden test to rational basis review represents a significant change in how courts will evaluate abortion regulations going forward, giving states much broader authority to regulate or restrict abortion practices.